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We've lost several officers recently, in the line of duty. Our prayers go out to the families of those officers. It is very easy to "Monday Morning Quarterback" the actions of these officers and I do not believe in doing that. We will never know what they were thinking and feeling. We do however need to respectfully disect the incidents, to learn from them. Doing this is not to critique the officers involved. It is to save the lives of our brothers and sisters that find themselves in a similiar situation. |
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Additional Information May Be Found On The Degrata Tactical Website
HUMOR - A Valentine Story to Warm Your Heart
Little Melissa comes home from first grade and tells her father that they learned about the history of Valentine's Day.
"Since Valentine's Day is for a Christian saint and we're Jewish," she asks, "will God get mad at me for giving someone a valentine?"
Melissa's father thinks a bit, then says "No, I don't think God would get mad. Who do you want to give a valentine to?"
"Osama Bin Laden," she says.
"Why Osama Bin Laden?," her father asks in shock.
"Well," she says, "I thought that if a little American Jewish girl could have enough love to give Osama a valentine, he might start to think that maybe we're not all bad, and maybe start loving people a little bit. And if other kids saw what I did and sent valentines to Osama, he'd love everyone a lot. And then he'd start going all over the place to tell everyone how much he loved them and how he didn't hate anyone anymore."
Her father's heart swells and he looks at his daughter with newfound pride. "Melissa, that's the most wonderful thing I've ever heard."
"I know," Melissa says, "and once that gets him out in the open, the Marines could blow the shit out of him."
The Blame Game By Seth Thompson
Cops like to blame people for things. It comes naturally to us, since it’s our job a lot of the time - we spend our days assigning the blame for speeding, causing accidents, starting fights and so on. We decide who to blame and treat them to a hefty ticket or a nice, comfy jail cell.
Unfortunately, we sometimes blame people we shouldn’t - our fellow cops.
Two recent shooting incidents and the immediate, almost automatic response from the second-guessers and the “shoulda, coulda” crowd have gotten me to thinking about the Blame Game. As cops and as instructors, we should think very carefully about how we react to these incidents, and how we like to assign blame for the results. These incidents are big examples of how not to deal with the use of deadly force and what leads up to it.
The first example comes from my own agency, a small place that had gone many years without any kind of shooting involving their officers. Then one evening, a suicidal off-duty cop from another state squirted off ten shots from a 9mm Glock in a motel room, narrowly missing our officers that were there do a “routine welfare check”. No one was hurt, and the officers quickly bagged the suspect without further shooting.
During the next few days, I heard no less than ten different versions of the shooting. None of the people involved were there. The use-of-force experience and training of a few of these self-appointed “experts” was mostly from television shows, as far as I could tell. Every single one of them was quick to tell me just how the officers at the scene had screwed up in some way and to let me know “I would have done X, Y, or Z”.
Over the course of those days, I also spoke informally with all three officers actually involved in the incident. Their view of the incident was a lot different than the people who were not there. Anyone who has been in a stressful critical incident would understand: Real life is not like television.
In this incident, like most other “real-life” encounters, things were very confusing. The situation was fluid and ever-changing. Murphy’s Law and the “Fog of War” ruled the hot few minutes these officers had to deal with a suddenly-armed suspect, in a situation that was not black-and-white. Equipment and plans did not work exactly as they should. Mistakes were made.
One thing was a lot like TV- the Good Guys overcame the obstacles and won.
In the second incident, a high-profile shooting took place in a big city, at a fast-food restaurant. An armed citizen interrupted a felon in the middle of a robbery and engaged him. The citizen was hit several times, but stayed in the fight and stopped the threat. He is currently recovering from his non-life-threatening injuries. The felon is taking a dirt nap.
After the incident there was a lot of public second-guessing, including some overheated commentary from the owner of a well-known shooting school, to the effect that he knew the incident didn’t involve a graduate of his, because of the many tactical mistakes the Good Guy made. It remains to be seen how the school owner would have performed in a stressful critical incident, because by all accounts, he’s never been in one.
Again, in this case, despite mistakes and the intervention of Mr. Murphy - the Good Guy overcame the obstacles and won. It’s thought he likely prevented other Good Guys in the restaurant from getting shot by the now room-temperature felon.
How could the aftermath of these incidents be handled differently? Instead of following our cop-instinct to blame someone for the incident turning into a big mess, we might just admit right from the start that when you are a Good Guy, the battle does not usually happen where and how you want it to. You have to play the hand you’re dealt and rely on your training to help you win. We could also realize that no plan ever survives its first contact with the enemy, and any mechanical device made by Man can break. Not to mention learning that attending any particular course or taking your advice from a certain guru does not turn you into a steely-eyed gunfighter.
We should do what it takes to learn from not just our mistakes, but from everyone else’s. Evaluate gunfights, no matter how screwy, messy, confused or mistake-studded they are with an eye to our own training and what we’re trying to teach and learn.
Above all, don’t blame the Good Guys. Help them do what it takes to win.
COPS SPEAK OUT - IS LAW ENFORCEMENT TRAINING A SHAM? - by Louis G. Dominguez
Lack of proper training and/or deficient training is handicapping cops and exposing them to danger and possibly even death. Training ought not to be an afterthought or an activity that law enforcement agencies cannot afford. Training is a matter of survival, and not only that, but also has a huge impact on morale as well.
Every law enforcement agency should have a minimum of one complete working day set aside for training every month and at least one week a year for specific or targeted training. Training requirements for specialized units should be more intense.
The usual 40 hours of training required every other year by some state departments of criminal justice services to maintain certification should not count as training per se because officers are allowed to select the courses that will take. Many law enforcement agencies are getting by with a half hour of training now and then during roll call. The whole thing is a sham, because the roll call room and what is going on there is not conducive to learning anything.
A serious approach to training where the team concept is emphasized can result in a more effective police force, but most importantly it will it also improve morale. Equally important is instruction and formal training exercises on homeland security issues. This ought to include things like document identification and verification credentials, biometrics, access control procedures, explosives and bombs, biological and delivery systems, toxins and poisons and delivery systems, nuclear dirty bombs, and all the other topics and issues associated with terrorist attacks.
Availability of resources is often cited as a reason for not training cops as it should be done. But in reality, training does not need to cost an arm and a leg. Being creative and not afraid to ask for help can go a long way in producing a training program to match the expected demands of a particular law enforcement agency. The cost of training should not be viewed as an expense – it's an investment that will pay high dividends to the agency, the local government and the community we’re charged with serving and protecting.
Louis G. Dominguez is a certified law enforcement officer in Virginia and a nationally recognized crime prevention and homeland security expert.
FBI DIRECTOR WARNS OF TERROR ATTACKS ON U.S. CITIES
By Carrie Johnson (Washington Post Staff Writer)
Monday, February 23, 2009; 3:19 PM
FBI Director Robert S. Mueller III today warned that extremists "with large agendas and little money can use rudimentary weapons" to sow terror, raising the specter that recent attacks in Mumbai that killed 170 people last year could embolden terrorists seeking to attack U.S. cities.
At a speech to the Council on Foreign Relations in Washington, Mueller said that the bureau is expanding its focus beyond al-Qaeda and into splinter groups, radicals who try to enter the country through the visa waiver program and "home-grown terrorists."
"The universe of crime and terrorism stretches out infinitely before us, and we too are working to find what we believe to be out there but cannot always see," Mueller said.
One particular concern, the FBI director said, springs from the country's background as a "nation of immigrants." Federal officials worry about pockets of possible radicals among melting-pot communities in the United States such as Seattle, San Diego, Miami or New York.
A Joint Terrorism Task Force led by the FBI, for instance, continues to investigate a group in Minneapolis after one young man last fall flew to Somalia and became what authorities believe to be the first U.S. citizen to carry out a suicide bombing. As many as a half-dozen other youths from that community in Minnesota have vanished, alarming their parents and raising concerns among law enforcement officials that a dangerous recruiting network has operated under the radar.
"The prospect of young men, indoctrinated and radicalized in their own communities . . . is a perversion of the immigrant story," Mueller said.
For the first time, Mueller also disclosed details about FBI efforts to assist Indian authorities probing a November siege by conspirators with ties to a terrorist group in Pakistan. FBI Special Agent Steve Merrill, a legal attache posted to the bureau's office in New Delhi, had been preparing to play cricket for the American team competing at the Maharajah's annual tournament, the FBI director recalled.
Instead Merrill detoured to Mumbai, where he helped to rescue Americans trapped in the burning Taj Hotel and coordinated the arrival of the bureau's rapid deployment team.
Analysts and agents from the FBI ultimately conducted 60 interviews including one of the lone surviving attacker, Ajmal Amir Kasab. Forensics experts pulled fingerprints from improvised explosive devices and recovered data from damaged cellphones, once "literally wiring a smashed phone back together," Mueller said.
By Amanda Cregan
The Intelligencer
Terrorism experts say homeland security begins at the school bus stop.
It's a school security gap that most parents, police and school officials don't always see, but terrorists do.
School buses can be vulnerable to a potential attacker, but are often overlooked in a school district's security plan.
That's why 75 police officers, detectives, emergency workers and school administrators from across Montgomery, Bucks and the rest of the Philadelphia region spent Monday learning how to shore up the gap in a course on "School Bus Safety in a Post 9/11 Era" held at the North Montco Technical Career Center in Towamencin and hosted by the Southeast Region Terrorism Taskforce.
Bus safety is an issue that presenter Curtis Lavarello says needs be to taken seriously.
"Based on the assumption by the FBI, there will be further terrorist attacks and school buses are soft targets," said the 23-year law enforcement veteran from Florida. "It's been found that children could be the next target for terrorists."
Because school districts are so fragmented in Pennsylvania, districts each decide if they will contract out for transportation or operate their own bus system, which makes it harder to streamline bus security across the state, he said.
Police and school administrators need to better monitor their school bus yards and need to know if the buses are in a secure compound, who has access to the buses, are they monitored by guards and are the lots properly lit.
Recently, a police officer happened to drive by a dark, unsecured school bus lot in Florida and spotted someone cutting the buses' brake lines, said Lavarello.
"It's a very real threat to our children across the country in terms of homeland security," he said.
But the first line of defense in school security can start with parents at the bus stop and the school bus drivers.
Parents need to be observant of individuals they've never seen before or strange vehicles in close proximity to their child's bus stop.
A potential attacker would also notice if parents habitually chat at length with bus drivers, prolonging the bus' stop and opening the site up to attack.
Bus drivers also need to be more aware of the emotional state of students on the bus, if they are crying or seem upset or depressed. Reporting disturbed students to school officials could be a way to stop them if they plan to carry out a violent school act.
"You have to realize that what happens in school, happens on the school bus. Everyone is focusing on the protection of schools, but the bus safety is really lacking," said Sean Burke, president of School Safety Advocacy Council. "I think were sadly misinformed to think that people who plan to do our children harm don't know this."
Amanda Cregan can be reached at 215-538-6371 or acregan@phillyBurbs.com.
Associated Press
BRIDGEPORT, Texas — A motorist fleeing police during a high-speed chase slammed into a patrol car Thursday, killing a police officer, authorities said.
Stephen York, 44, of Bridgeport, was charged with capital murder and was being held on $1 million bond, the Wise County Sheriff's Office said. It was not immediately clear if he had an attorney.
Sgt. Randy White was pulling over a pickup hauling a flatbed trailer, trying to get it off the road to prevent a potential injury, when the suspect's vehicle slammed into his patrol car from behind, city spokeswoman Amber Fogelman said. The patrol car did not catch fire but was crumpled, and White died at the scene.
York was airlifted to a hospital in nearby Fort Worth; his condition was unavailable Thursday night.
Police Chief Randy Singleton said it appeared from the preliminary investigation that the driver "intentionally rammed into the officer at a high rate of speed."
White, 32, was one of three Bridgeport officers responding to the chase that began in Decatur after a hit-and-run accident, authorities said.
"Sgt. Randy White was a hero. In our thinking, (he) did save the lives of other people by putting himself between the suspect and these citizens," Singleton said.
"This is the first time we've had an officer lose his life in active duty in the city. It's a loss. It's a loss for all of us," Mayor Donald Majka told Dallas-Fort Worth television station KTVT.
Copyright 2009 Associated Press. All rights reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten, or redistributed.
By PoliceOne Senior Correspondent Chuck Remsberg
06/18/2007 PoliceOne.com - Sponsored by Blauer
Fifteen years ago, after an exhaustive five-year study of officer murders, a research team from the FBI delivered a simple but compelling message: there are certain behavioral characteristics that tend to get cops killed.
No single profile of ill-fated officers can be defined, the researchers cautioned, because there are too many unpredictable variables in the “deadly mix” that results in officer fatalities. But certain “general descriptors,” treacherous specifics of a personal operating style, often appear to be shared by officers who fall prey to the predators who cross their paths.
All these traits can be overcome or avoided if you approach the street with tactical awareness. They’ve been widely publicized, for several years were detailed in Calibre Press’ Street Survival Seminar, and have been repeatedly featured at law enforcement training conferences.
Yet as we saw last week with the slaying of a trusting, small-town police chief in Kentucky, the potentially lifesaving lessons inherent in the FBI’s findings are still being tragically ignored.
The chief, a 22-year veteran, handcuffed a DUI suspect in front instead of in back. It was a courtesy he often indulged in with arrestees he knew, and he had arrested this suspect numerous times; the offender considered him “a family friend.” Moments after the cuffing, authorities said, the prisoner accessed a gun and shot the chief point blank in the back of the head as they drove toward jail.
As the chief’s name is chiseled into the Memorial Wall, it seems fitting to once again review what the FBI calls “Behavioral Descriptors for Victim Officers.” These were first identified in 1992 in the landmark study Killed in the Line of Duty, by the research team of Dr. Anthony Pinizzotto, Edward Davis, and Charles Miller III. The researchers reiterated the checklist in their recently released study of felonious assaults on LEOs, Violent Encounters.
Based on extensive interviews with the victim officers’ attackers, peers, and supervisors, here are the traits the studies say are frequently associated with officers who end up getting killed. The researchers note in their latest report, “[O] fficers need not exhibit all of these behavioral characteristics to place themselves as risk.”
1. Friendly.
This adjective was frequently used to describe the murdered officers, along with “well-liked,” “laid back,” and “easy going.” While a friendly demeanor “does much to promote a positive image for the officer and the department, overly friendly behavior at an inappropriate time” can backfire, the researchers warn. That mind-set can lull you into a sense of complacency, lead to the granting of dangerous favors or accommodations, and “might be misinterpreted by an offender as potential weakness…a sign of vulnerability.”
A savvy officer knows it’s often useful to appear friendly as a conscious strategy, but you “never should let down [your] guard, because no one can know what is in the mind of another person.” The subject you’re dealing with “may be contemplating [your] assault to effect an escape.”
2. Service-oriented.
“Tends to perceive self as more public relations than law enforcement,” the researchers said of the prototypical slain officer. Of course service is part of your job. But on the street, your “customer” is not always right. To protect and serve the community, the researchers remind, “officers must realize that they need to protect themselves first” and not indulge a “misguided sense of service” that results in “placing prisoners’ comfort over their own personal safety.”
In policing, your success—and your safety—often depend on your ability to get people to do what they don’t want to do.
3. Hesitant about using force.
Victim officers tended “to use less force than other officers felt they would use in similar circumstances,” the researchers found. And they customarily “used force only as a last resort;” their peers said they themselves “would use force at an earlier point in similar circumstances.”
Courts have clearly confirmed that it’s justifiable in situations you reasonably perceive as threatening to employ even preemptive force to stop a threat; you don’t have to wait until you are assaulted or injured. Yet some trainers are noticing that some officers today seem so hesitant about using force that it appears they are more afraid of being sued or thought overzealous than they are of being murdered! [Read Are we breeding a police culture of “additional victims?”]
4. Given to short-cutting.
Victim officers often “failed to follow established procedures,” the researchers report. They ignored or sidestepped rules, “especially in regard to arrests, confrontations with prisoners, traffic stops, and waiting for backup when backup is available.” Many times, this was linked to being a hard worker, rather than being lazy or indifferent; the officer was a top performer, driven to amass more arrests, snare more commendations, get recognized with a plum assignment or other award.
Paradoxically, the researchers state, rule-breakers often are rewarded after violating procedures that are designed to protect them. Which, of course, encourages more such behavior that can “endanger both the officers and their partners.”
5. Trusting of “perceptual shorthand.”
In other words, officers who ended up dead often relied heavily on their perceived ability to “read” people and situations. They depended on “a rapid or abbreviated process” by which they analyzed environments and subjects and, based on their quick perceptions or feel, “acted accordingly.” That often meant dropping their guard.
Commonly they were optimists; they tended “to look for ‘good’ in others.” When they saw signs of cooperation, heard promises not to cause trouble, enjoyed a prior history of non-violent contacts with a suspect, sensed they had rapport, and the like, they tended to feel they were home free, rather than maintaining a mind-set that stays open to subtle and not-so-subtle shifts in every interaction.
Regrettably, the research team points out, “victim officers’ evaluations of offenders often prove inaccurate.” The murdered officers made themselves vulnerable by failing “to recognize that their perception of an incident can vary greatly from the offender’s perception of what is occurring” and what may occur before the contact is over.
From what we know, did the professional personality of the unfortunate chief in Kentucky reflect at least some of these don’t-do traits?
Count the ways.
Then ask yourself to what extent you sometimes lapse into these same perilous behaviors because of complacency, fatigue, impatience, inflated confidence, or pressures of the moment.
And remember: The important lessons of life—and death—tend to be repeated until learned.
How to Beat Special Forces, S.W.A.T. and Special Operations Groups.
by Anonymous
http://www.bcrevolution.ca/government_thugs.htm
To enforce tyranny, governments must rely on Special Forces, SSG, SWAT and Special Operations Groups. SSG stands for Surveillance Specialist Group—that’s spy talk for a "surveillance team". SWAT stands for Special Weapons And Tactics (i.e. a paramilitary death-squad). Special Forces, Special Operations Groups, SWAT and Special Activities Staff are all military squads that participate in a more advanced training for fighting in unusual urban environments. They all have a common component, although each of them have features peculiar to themselves. A major distinguishing factor is the ability to fight in close-quarters with a small group to achieve the goal of suppression.
They go by a lot of different names around the world, but a goon by any name is still a goon.
Up to now, the lethal combination of SSG and SWAT has proven disastrous for underground activists and their movements in the USAand Canada.
Is SWAT effective? Yes.
Does it get results? Absolutely.
Is SWAT invincible? No.
Despite their massive firepower and use of brute force, SWAT teams have weakness that can be exploited.
A typical SWAT element is composed of five people—a Team Leader, a Scout, a Backup, and two Assaulters.
The Team Leader is the most experienced of the five. He is the nerve center and tactical command of the team. The Team Leader is in direct voice-contact with the other four members of the SWAT element, who each wear a hands-free UHF transponder with an earpiece and a throat-vibration microphone.
The Scout performs on-scene reconnaissance. The Backup carries a 12-guage riot shotgun. He provides security for the Scout. The two Assaulters each carry Heckler & Koch 9mm MP-5 submachine guns. All members of the SWAT element usually carry handguns, often a .45 or 9mm semi-automatic pistol.
SWAT members often wear balaclavas for the purpose of intimidating suspects and bystanders. The balaclava also keeps them anonymous—this is done because they reside in the same communities whose citizens they execute, and also makes legal recourse and identification next to impossible.
SWAT members wear military helmets and bullet-resistant body-armour. These guys are goons and cowards in the truest sense of the word. They’ll kill you and go for lunch five minutes later. It’s nothing to them ; because of their myopic training, they figure the solution to every problem is massive application of force, preferably lethal.
Once it’s arrived on the scene, SWAT never withdraws.
In a typical call-out, the SWAT element is reinforced by duty police officers who form a containment perimeter at a distance from the suspect’s location. Police snipers may also be present. More than one SWAT element may be on the scene. A Crisis Negotiation Team (CNT) is often mustered.
CNT is somewhat of a misnomer, because their actual role is to obtain intelligence for an assault by SWAT—and to fatally distract the suspect in the moments preceding the assault. Ambulance and Fire personnel are also usually deployed mainly for the welfare of SWAT and Police.
Weakness: Lack of Knowledge of the Terrain. SWAT teams plan for many different environments, but can never know the terrain that they will be going into EXACTLY. You are on the ground there first, do your homework. Scout the building or area completely, and know it like the back of your hand. Find areas of weakness or exposure for incoming SOG teams. Try to lure them into those areas and then act swiftly.
Weakness: Training. They think of it as an advantage, and it is. Training is the only way to know how you and your team-mate will react in any certain situation. However, this advantage can be turned to weakness. The SOG teams have a response for every situation, and that response is PREDICTABLE. Take time to study SOG training, and you will see that they perform standard manoeuvres in situations. Apply this knowledge to your local environment, and you will be able to map out a SOG team’s reaction everywhere in your location. If you are in a building, study widely available SOG manuals for the manoeuvres, such as:
WEAKNESS - Intelligence: SWAT and Special Forces teams rely on intelligence to find and identify targets, which usually (in the case of Special Forces) means paid informants in a city or other locale. They pass their information on to the Joint Operations Command, which has coordinates Special Forces activities, and then the JOC passes the intelligence on to the commanders of the units.
TACTICAL RESPONSE - Confusion is the worst enemy of Special Forces. Interrupt the intelligence chain with conflicting reports. Use double agents as the paid informants for the JOC. Broadcast erroneous information.
SWAT WEAKNESS—LACK OF MOBILITY. Their combat gear prevents them from sprinting long distances in pursuit of a suspect fleeing on foot.
A number of suspects have escaped in exactly this scenario. This is the reason behind the containment perimeter. The regular cops pin you inside the “holding pen” while the SWAT goons methodically stalk you and then dispatch you, preferably from behind.
TACTICAL RESPONSE—If you know the terrain, you’ll often be able to beat the containment ring. The cops on the perimeter cover the main escape routes and checkpoints. The ring has gaps you can exploit. The cops seldom cover hidden routes that the only the local residents know about. Do your homework. Gather accurate intelligence. And rehearse, rehearse, rehearse.
SWAT WEAKNESS—THEY DON’T THINK. Their training has ingrained them with the mindset that the solution to every situation is force. SWAT is not motivated or inclined to negotiate or compromise. And they never withdraw.
TACTICAL RESPONSE—Plan your operation so that political considerations and/or public relations are more attractive to the authorities than a lethal resolution of the crisis by SWAT.
SWAT WEAKNESS --- OVERHEATING. Their balaclavas, gloves, shooting goggles, helmets, and combat fatigues mean that they can easily overheat in urban situations. It doesn’t take much activity to get them sweating. Literally.
TACTICAL RESPONSE—Plan an operation(s) that will require lots of physical movement by the SWAT members. Give them lots to crawl over, through, and around. Even big tough guys don’t have much stamina when they start to overheat.
SWAT WEAKNESS—PERIMETER OVER-RELIANCE. They always set up perimeter control. They have become dependent on the “holding pen” strategy.
In “Blackhawk Down” Mark Bowden notes that while the Delta Force “operators” are highly skilled, battle-tested veterans capable of almost anything, their support and perimeter control team, the U.S. Army Rangers, are generally young, inexperienced, overconfident, and unready for the ugly realities of real combat. [Likewise, regular duty cops]
TACTICAL RESPONSE—Post an accomplice (ie sniper) outside their perimeter and SWAT becomes vulnerable to a flanking attack.
SWAT WEAKNESS—ONE TRICK PONY. They are trained to attack fixed targets. They are befuddled and confounded by a moving target. Especially a target they are continually losing contact with.
TACTICAL RESPONSE—Hit and run. Hit and run. Hit and run. Then disappear. Your key to tactical success consists of carefully planned escape routes, accomplice drivers, and prearranged support (ie hiding) from the local population. This was used to great effect in Mogadishu, Somalia, by local warlord forces. After the ambush, U.S.troops were withdrawn, leaving local forces in control. SWAT WEAKNESS—LACK OF INDIVIDUAL INITIATIVE. Without their body-rig communication sets, SWAT members are lost. UHF frequency range is often less than a mile. Range deteriorates in locations with reinforced concrete and metal debris.
TACTICAL RESPONSE—Forcing or duping a SWAT member to transmit bogus messages over his transponder is an effective tactic for disorienting the entire team. Seizing a transponder and issuing your own messages is effective psychological warfare. Your voice is right inside their heads—and these guys aren’t exactly the brightest specimens our species has produced. Selecting a location that interferes with UHF transmission is a sound tactic.
3 GOLDEN RULES FOR BEATING SWAT:
RULE #1 -- Surround the SWAT element, including its perimeter force.
RULE #2 -- Fight scattered, never in a compact body.
RULE #3 -- When attacked, never stand and fight. Retreat, then counterattack.
Some resistance movements hold the view that if surrounded, you should immediately pick the weakest point, focus on it, and make a determined effort to break out. The resulting break in the enemy’s line will produce two exposed flanks which you can counterattack, possibly more. Savvy readers and students of American history will recognize these tactics as the same as those used by the natives to maul the British Regular Army in the 1600s and 1700s in colonial America.
All things considered, however, your greatest single asset is your ability to choose the location. This means planning ahead. It means being a moving target. It means not sleeping where SWAT can find you. Heed the warning in the training manual of the Provisional IRA—“Get your defense before you get your offense.” And remember that this website does not endorse, condone, or encourage illegal activity.
ZARAR KHAN, Associated Press Writer – Sun Apr 5, 6:20 pm ET
ISLAMABAD – A suicide bombing at a crowded Shiite mosque south of Pakistan's capital killed 22 people Sunday, the latest evidence of how security in the U.S.-allied nation is crumbling well beyond the Afghan border region where al-Qaida and Taliban fighters thrive.
The violence came as a senior Pakistani Taliban commander said his group was behind a deadly suicide bombing Saturday night in Islamabad and promised two more attacks per week in the country if the U.S. does not stop missile strikes on Pakistani territory.
Sunday's suicide bomber set off his explosives at the entrance to a mosque in Chakwal city in Punjab province, some 50 miles (80 kilometers) south of Islamabad, said Nadeem Hasan Asif, a top security official in the province. The blast killed 22 and wounded dozens, he said.
A little-known group believed linked to the Pakistani Taliban claimed it had staged the attack. Pakistan also has a history of sectarian violence, often involving Sunni extremists targeting minority Shiite Muslims.
TV footage showed pools of blood in front of the mosque. Torn clothes and shoes littered the ground, while at least one car and four motorcycles were damaged. A policeman with bandaged legs and a wounded man wearing a bloodstained shirt were shown on hospital beds crying in pain. A woman standing in the emergency ward of the hospital wailed, "Oh my God! Oh my God!"
Farid Ali said he was leaving the mosque when he felt the blast on his back.
"I saw several people lying dead," he told Express News TV. "There was blood everywhere."
Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani condemned the attack and directed authorities to "bring the perpetrators to justice." Such statements from the premier have become a matter of routine in Pakistan, where extremists seem bent on wreaking havoc.
Most of the militant attacks in Pakistan occur in the northwest, where the Taliban and al-Qaida have strongholds from which they plan strikes on U.S. and NATO forces across the border in Afghanistan. Still, all of the country's major cities have experienced assaults.
About a week ago, gunmen raided a police academy on the outskirts of Lahore, a vibrant city in the east near the Indian border, killing at least 12 people in a commando-style attack that prompted an eight-hour standoff with security forces.
Late last month, a suicide bomber blew himself up in a packed mosque near the Afghan border at the climax of a Friday prayer service, killing 48 people and wounding scores more in the worst attack to hit Pakistan this year.
Some militant groups that are historically sectarian are believed to have forged ties with the Pakistani Taliban, themselves followers of a harsh brand of Sunni Islam.
A man who goes by the name Umar Farooq and says he speaks for the shadowy militant organization Fedayeen al-Islam told The Associated Press via telephone that the group had staged Sunday's attack on the mosque as part of a "campaign against infidels."
He also warned the U.S. to stop its drone-fired missile strikes on militant targets in Pakistan's northwest.
Little is known of the group, but it is believed linked to the Pakistani Taliban.
In the past it has said it was behind other attacks, including the bombing of Islamabad's Marriott Hotel and last week's attack on the police academy in Lahore, but officials have never named it as a primary suspect.
Ignoring official Pakistani protests, the U.S. has escalated its campaign of missile strikes since August of last year.
Pakistani Taliban chief Baitullah Mehsud — who also claimed responsibility for the attack on the police academy — has vowed more assaults unless the U.S. shelves the drone-fired missiles.
His deputy Hakimullah Mehsud told AP the Pakistani Taliban carried out Saturday's suicide attack against the paramilitary camp in Islamabad. He, too, cited the missile strikes, and promised that the group would carry out two suicide attacks per week in Pakistan.
He also said Pakistani troops should withdraw from parts of the northwest.
"We have shown enough restraint," Hakimullah Mehsud said. "Previously, we were striking once in three months, but from now onward we will go for at least two suicide attacks a week."
Ole was walking home late at night, through the park and sees a woman in the shadows.
"Twenty dollars" she whispers. He'd never been with a hooker before, but decides, what the hell, it's only twenty bucks.
So they hide in the bushes. They're going "at it" for a minute when all of a sudden a light flashes on them -- it's a police officer.
"What's going on here, people?" asks the officer.
"I'm making luff to my vife," Ole answers indignantly.
"Oh, I'm sorry." says the cop. "I didn't know."
"Vell," says Ole, "I din't neder, 'til you shine dat light in her face!